George
has published an Op-Ed in The Guardian about the financial consequences for the
UK if voters decide to leave the EU. Among other things, he says the value of
Sterling would decline and unemployment would rise.
Michael
Vachon
June 2,
2016
By George Soos
David Cameron, along with the Treasury, the Bank of England, the International Monetary Fund and others have been attacked for exaggerating the economic risks of leaving the EU. This criticism has been widely accepted by the British media and many financial analysts. As a result, British voters are now grossly underestimating the true costs of Brexit.
Too many believe that a vote to leave the EU
will have no effect on their personal financial position. This is wishful
thinking. It would have at least one very clear and immediate effect that will
touch every household: the value of the pound would decline precipitously. It
would also have an immediate and dramatic impact on financial markets, investment,
prices and jobs.
As opinion polls on the referendum result
fluctuate, I want to offer a clear set of facts, based on my six decades of
experience in financial markets, to help voters understand the very real
consequences of a vote to leave the EU.
The Bank of England, the Institute for Fiscal
Studies and the IMF have assessed the long-term economic consequences of
Brexit. They suggest an income loss of £3,000 to £5,000 annually per-household
once the British economy settles down to its new steady-state five years or so
after Brexit. But there are some more immediate financial consequences that
have hardly been mentioned in the referendum debate.
To start off, sterling is almost certain to
fall steeply and quickly if leave wins the referendum. I would expect this
devaluation to be bigger and also more disruptive than the 15% devaluation that
occurred in September 1992, when I was fortunate enough to make a substantial
profit for my hedge fund investors, at the expense of the Bank of England and the
British government.
It is reasonable to assume, given the
expectations implied by the market pricing at present, that after a Brexit vote
the pound would fall by at least 15% and possibly more than 20%, from its
present level of $1.46 to below $1.15 (which would be between 25% and 30% below
its pre-referendum trading range of $1.50 to $1.60). If sterling fell to this
level, then ironically one pound would be worth about one euro – a method of
“joining the euro” that nobody in Britain would want.
Brexiters seem to recognize that a sharp devaluation would be almost inevitable after Brexit, but argue that this would be healthy, despite the big losses of purchasing power for British households. In 1992 the devaluation actually proved very helpful to the British economy, and subsequently I was even praised for my role in helping to bring it about.
But I don’t think the 1992 experience would be repeated. That devaluation was healthy because the government was relieved of its obligation to “defend” an overvalued pound with damagingly high interest rates after the breakdown of the exchange rate mechanism. This time, a large devaluation would be much less benign than in 1992, for at least three reasons.
First, the Bank of England would not cut interest rates after a Brexit devaluation (as it did in 1992 and also after the large devaluation of 2008) because interest rates are already at the lowest level compatible with the stability of British banks. That, incidentally, is another reason to worry about Brexit. For if a fall in house prices and loss of jobs causes a recession after Brexit, as is likely, there will be very little that monetary policy can do to stimulate the economy and counteract the consequent loss of demand.
the UK now has a very large current
account deficit much larger, relatively, than in 1992 or 2008. In fact Britain
is more dependent than at any time in history on foreign capital. As the
governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney said, Britain “depends on the
kindness of strangers”. The devaluations of 1992 and 2008 encouraged greater
capital inflows, especially into residential and commercial property, but also
into manufacturing investments. But after Brexit, the capital flows would
almost certainly move the other way, especially during the two-year period of
uncertainty while Britain negotiates its terms of divorce with a region that
has always been and presumably will remain its biggest trading and investment
partner.
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